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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 10, 1984, the President signed into law the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.1 This leg-
islation was the long-awaited congressional response to the Su-
preme Court's invalidation on constitutional grounds of provisions
' 1985, Lawrence P. King and Vanderbilt Law Review.
* Charles Seligson Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; of counsel,
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York City; Editor-in-Chief, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
(15th ed.); member, Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference of
the United States; B.S.S. 1950, City College of New York; LL.B. 1953, New York University;
LL.M. 1957, University of Michigan.
1. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333 (to be codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
675
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:675
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The Supreme Court found
unconstitutional a basic jurisdictional provision in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 19782 and held that the jurisdiction given to a bank-
ruptcy court under the 1978 Act was too broad for a nonarticle III
court.'
The 1984 amendments could have eliminated the constitu-
tional defects of the 1978 Act by converting the bankruptcy courts
to article III courts.4 But faced with the well-organized opposition
of the rest of the federal judiciary, which adamantly had refused to
accept life tenure for bankruptcy judges since it was first proposed
in 1977, 5 Congress did not adopt this simple solution to the juris-
diction problem. The subject of this Article is the complex and
convoluted judicial system Congress created in the 1984
amendments.
II. JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Section 1334(a) of the Judicial Code, as amended in 1984,
vests original and exclusive jurisdiction in the United States dis-
trict court over all cases arising under the Bankruptcy Code. The
word "case" is a term of art and comports with the usage in the
Bankruptcy Code7 and the Bankruptcy -Rules.8 "Case" comprises
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1471, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) was invalidated by the
Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982).
3. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84-87 (1982).
Judges appointed pursuant to article III must be appointed for a term of good behavior,
that is, life tenure, and their salaries must not be subject to reduction while in office.
4. In fact, Representative Peter Rodino, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee,
introduced H.R. 6978 in the 97th Congress, 2d Session, which provided for the appointment
of bankruptcy judges under article III of the Constitution. This bill was approved by the
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law and the full Judiciary Committee. It did
not go further in that Congress, and in the 98th.Congress, 1st Session, it was reintroduced as
H.R. 3. This bill was also approved by both the Subcommittee and the full Judiciary Com-
mittee, but when it finally came to the floor of the House, the article III provisions were
stricken and a provision appointing bankruptcy judges for a term of 14 years was inserted.
See H.R. RE. No. 9, pt. 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1983); 130 CONG. REc. H1796 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 1984) (H.R. 5174 was the bill acted upon and was the replacement for H.R. 3.).
5. H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), was the first of the several drafts of bankruptcy
bills to establish the bankruptcy courts as article III courts. See KL.E, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE NEw BANKRUPTCY LAW, in 2 App. COLLIER ON BANKRuPTCY x, xi (L. King 15th ed.
1984).
6. The terms "Bankruptcy Code" or "Code" are used herein to denote provisions in
Title 11, United States Code.
7. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982) ("A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is
commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition .... ).
8. See, e.g., BANaR. R. 1002. The distinction between "case" and "proceeding" was
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the entire Chapter 7, 9, 11, or 13 case that is commenced pursuant
to section 301, 302, or 303 of the Bankruptcy Code by the filing of
a "petition,"" another word of art.
Disputes often arise during the pendency of a Chapter 7, 9, 11,
or 13 case that require judicial resolution. Section 1334(b) refers to
these disputes as "proceedings." There may, therefore, be numer-
ous proceedings within a case. Section 1334(b) provides that the
United States district courts have original, but not exclusive, juris-
diction over civil proceedings arising in or related to Code cases or
under the Code itself. Under the Bankruptcy Rules, these proceed-
ings are labeled either adversary and governed by Part VII of the
Rules, or contested and governed by Rules 9014 and 9013. Accord-
ingly, subsections (a) and (b) carefully distinguish between the
words "case" and "proceeding," recognizing that a case com-
menced under the Bankruptcy Code differs substantially from a
typical civil action commenced in state or federal court to resolve a
two-party dispute.
Subsections (a) and (b) of section 1334 track the wording of
subsections (a) and (b) of section 1471, which was added by the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Although section 1334 replaces
section 1471 insofar as these two subsections are concerned, the
intent is the same: all jurisdiction over and under Title 11 of the
United States Code is vested in the United States District Court,
an article III court. Section 1471(c), however, also had transferred
all of the district court's bankruptcy jurisdiction to the United
States bankruptcy courts. These bankruptcy courts were and are
nonarticle III courts. This subsection caused the United States Su-
preme Court to hold section 1471 and other sections unconstitu-
tional. The broad and pervasive jurisdiction contained in section
1471(a) and (b) could not be vested constitutionally, as provided in
subsection (c), in a court whose judges were not appointed for a
term of good behavior and whose salaries were subject to diminu-
tion while in office.1" Section 1334 does not contain any provision
previously contained in the 1973 Bankruptcy Rules. See former BANma. R. 101 and Advisory
Committee's note thereto.
9. See supra notes 7-8. A "complaint" commences an adversary proceeding pursuant
to Bankruptcy Rule 7003; a "motion" commences a contested matter pursuant to Bank-
ruptcy Rule 9014.
10. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). Sec-
tion 1471 was designed to accord the bankruptcy court expanded or pervasive jurisdiction
over all issues relating to the debtor's estate. In contrast, under prior law jurisdiction was
bifurcated into categories of "summary" and "plenary" jurisdiction. The bankruptcy courts
had only summary jurisdiction, which was present ony if the court had actual or construc-
19851 677
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similar to former section 1471(c). It grants broad and pervasive ju-
risdiction to the article III district court, and the district judges, in
their discretion, may exercise this jurisdiction.11
III. REFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
The real issue addressed by the 1984 amendments is the juris-
diction of the bankruptcy court.12 The 1984 amendments do not
require the district courts to refer bankruptcy cases to the bank-
ruptcy courts but allows them to do SO. 23 Each district court may
refer all, some, or no cases and proceedings or parts thereof to the
bankruptcy judges of the district. The authority to refer cases and
proceedings under section 157(a) has been exercised by local rule
or order in all federal judicial districts. Accordingly, bankruptcy
judges continue to handle most, if not all, bankruptcy cases.
Two basic considerations appear to have motivated the 1984
legislation. The first was the congressional attempt to cure the un-
constitutional jurisdictional defects. As this Article makes clear,
another case undoubtedly will wend its way to the Supreme Court
and challenge the constitutionality of the 1984 amendments. 14 The
second consideration was the district courts' already ample work-
tive possession of the property in issue or if the adverse claimant expressly or impliedly
consented to jurisdiction. Much time and money were expended in ascertaining whether the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over a matter.
11. Not surprisingly, the district judges prefer not to exercise their bankruptcy juris-
diction. The district courts are overburdened with their civil and criminal dockets without
the annual addition of some 300,000 new bankruptcy cases. This consideration must have
been on the collective congressional mind when Congress added § 157 to Title 28 in 1984,
and provided that the district court may refer all of its bankruptcy jurisdiction to the bank-
ruptcy court.
12. Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 336 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 151), the bankruptcy
judges constitute a unit of the district court in each district, to be known as the bankruptcy
court for the district. The superseded provision, 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1982), labeled what was
denominated as an adjunct of the district court the United States Bankruptcy Court. Tech-
nically speaking, it is no longer a United States bankruptcy court although it is a bank-
ruptcy court pursuant to § 151.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) provides: "Each district court may provide that any or all cases
under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a
case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district."
14. There are cases pending which raise the constitutionality of the 1984 amendments
to the Judicial Code concerning the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. See In re J. Cat-
ton Farms, Inc., No. 183-00655 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. filed Apr. 30, 1983); In re Mason & Dixon
Lines, Inc., No. B-84-00377C-11 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. filed Mar. 29, 1984); In re Production
Steel, No. 382-01255 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. filed Apr. 22, 1982); In re Tom Carter Enters., 12
BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 536 (1984); In re Shearn Moody, Jr., No. B-83-01490C-11 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. filed Nov. 14, 1983).
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load and the evident lack of desire and inability of the district
court judges to take on more work. Accordingly, the 1984 legisla-
tion attempts to meet the constitutional objections without over-
loading the United States district judges.
A. Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court
Section 157(a) permits the district courts to make a general
reference of all Title 11 cases and proceedings to the bankruptcy
judges. The issue thereby raised concerns the overall authority of
the bankruptcy judges over these cases and proceedings. More pre-
cisely, what is the difference between section 157(a), as added in
1984, and section 1471(c), as added in 1978 and held invalid in
1982? In invalidated section 1471(c), Congress delegated jurisdic-
tion to a nonarticle III court. In section 157(a), both Congress and
the district courts delegated jurisdiction to a nonarticle III court.
Interestingly, section 157 is captioned "Procedures." The following
discussion will illustrate that a more accurate caption would have
been "Jurisdiction."
Section 157 spells out the role of the bankruptcy judge in
some detail. It deals with something more than mere procedure,
paper shuffling, time periods, and similar matters. First, the sec-
tion creates a dichotomy between "core" and "noncore" proceed-
ings. 15 Second, section 157 specifies the ultimate judicial authority
of the bankruptcy judge regarding both core and noncore proceed-
ings. The authority differs sharply and the determination whether
a proceeding is core or noncore has significant substantive and pro-
cedural consequences. Whether the nonarticle III bankruptcy
judge should be permitted to exercise its discretion in making this
determination may have constitutional implications. 16 Any limita-
tion on this role will necessarily define the part to be played by the
article III district judge.
1. Entry of Final Orders
The determination whether a particular proceeding is a core or
noncore proceeding defines the ultimate power or, in -constitutional
terms, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Section 157(b)(1)
15. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2), discussed infra text accompanying notes 41-60, provides a
list of core proceedings. Presumably all others (if there are any others) are within the
noncore category and subject to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) except as provided in § 157(b)(5).
16. The relevant provisions specifying the authority of the bankruptcy judge in core
proceedings are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) and, for noncore proceedings, in § 157(c),
both of which are discussed infra pp. 680-95.
1985]
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provides that bankruptcy judges have authority to enter final or-
ders in core proceedings. It states that bankruptcy judges may
"hear and determine" all cases under Title 11 and all core proceed-
ings arising in or related thereto. That language obviously means
that bankruptcy judges may enter final orders in core proceedings.
The consequence of determining that a proceeding is a core
proceeding has far-reaching implications in bankruptcy appellate
procedures. The appellate process, which is set out in section 158
of Title 28, as added in 1984, revolves around the final order en-
tered by a bankruptcy judge pursuant to section 157(b)(1) or
(c) (2).' 7 A major distinction between the bankruptcy judge and the
district judge lies beneath the surface of the language of section
158. If, on the one hand, the district judge enters the final order,
section 158 does not prescribe the appellate procedure in an appeal
from that order; it is wholly inapplicable. Since it is a final order of
the district court, appeals would follow the normal appellate proce-
dure contained in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure appli-
cable to any order of the district court that is appealed to the court
of appeals. If, on the other hand, it is a final order of the bank-
ruptcy judge, as authorized under section 157(b)(1) or (c)(2),11 an
appeal will follow the appellate procedure prescribed by section
158.19
2. Submission of Proposed Findings
Since the statute provides that the bankruptcy judge may
enter final orders in core proceedings, .noncore proceedings must
have a different authority. Section 157(c)(1) is the counterpart to
section 157(b)(1) and concerns noncore proceedings. Theoretically,
the 1984 amendments have rendered the bankruptcy judge's role
much more limited and the district judge's role more broad. In
17. Section 158(a) provides: "The district courts . . . shall have jurisdiction to hear
appeals from final judgments, orders, and decrees, and, with leave of the court, from inter-
locutory orders and decrees, of bankruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings referred
to the bankruptcy judges under section 157 of this title." "Final order" is used in two differ-
ent ways in § 157(b)(1) and in § 158. The final order entered pursuant to the grant of
authority in § 157(b)(1) may, for purposes of § 158, be either final with a right of appeal, or
interlocutory which requires permission to appeal. But whether final or interlocutory, it is
entered by the bankruptcy judge whereas, under § 157(c)(1), the bankruptcy judge may
enter only proposed findings and the district judge must enter the final order in the particu-
lar proceeding.
18. Section 157(c)(2), discussed infra pp. 682-86, permits entry of a final order by the
bankruptcy judge on consent of the parties in a noncore proceeding.
19. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
680 [Vol. 38:675
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noncore proceedings, section 157(c)(1) specifies that the bank-
ruptcy judge is to "submit proposed findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law to the district court." Any final order is to be entered
by the district judge after "considering" the proposed findings and
conclusions, or after "reviewing de novo" any matter in the pro-
posed findings and conclusions to which a party has "timely and
specifically" objected.
Section 157(c)(1) is rife with problems and temptations. The
major temptation is for the district judge to rubber-stamp the pro-
posed findings and conclusions of the bankruptcy judge. It would
come as a surprise to no one, particularly Congress, if a submission
of a bankruptcy judge to a district judge were to include an order
to be signed by the district judge. Will the district judge take the
time to "consider" the submission? What does "consider" mean?
One would suppose, at the very least, that consider means "to
read," but that can encroach upon the district judge's busy calen-
dar. Furthermore, the district judge "must" review de novo when
there is an objection. What does "review" mean? Certainly the dis-
trict judge can order a new trial. But what is minimally accept-
able? 20 If Congress had intended a trial by the district judge, it
could have specified this much more clearly. Obviously a new trial
is not intended. But what distinguishes "review" from
"consider"? 21
The purpose of section 157(c)(1) is to make the legislative
scheme appear constitutional in any case that may come before the
Supreme Court. Congress provided that, except for core matters
and absent consent of the parties, the article III court is the final
arbiter at the trial level. Thus, excessive jurisdiction is not given to
the nonarticle III court. The bankruptcy court is not even a finder
of fact. It submits facts that the article III court can disregard for
any reason. In practical terms, however, the nonarticle III court's
proposed findings and conclusions will be the findings and conclu-
20. Under the Emergency Rule in existence from December 25, 1982, until July 10,
1984, which had a similar "de novo" provision, it was held that a new trial is not required.
The district court should, nevertheless, examine the record without giving deference to pro-
posed findings. Moody v. Amoco Oil Co., 734 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
386 (1984). It is perhaps unrealistic to conclude that many district judges will follow this
directive.
21. As will be pointed out in the text infra notes 37-39, even if bankruptcy appellate
panels are established by the judicial council of the circuit, the parties nevertheless must
consent to having the panel instead of the district court hear the appeal. Presumably, appel-
lees will not readily consent to use of the appellate panel because of the perception that a
district judge is more likely to affirm the bankruptcy judge's order.
1985]
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sions. "Consider" and "review" will disintegrate into rubber-
stamped acceptances of the bankruptcy court's findings and con-
clusions. The constitutional protection for article III judges to ad-
judicate noncore proceedings has been accomplished semantically
and cosmetically. But actually little or no change will occur.
One effect of section 157 is the added opportunity for counsel
to employ delaying tactics. A built-in litigation ploy now is availa-
ble for one side of a disputed matter to assert that the proceeding
is noncore. Pursuant to section 157(b)(3), the bankruptcy judge
shall make such a determination, either on timely motion or sua
sponte. 2 Presumably, the order on this motion is an interlocutory
order and not subject to a right of appeal. Nevertheless, a party
seeking delay can apply for leave to appeal, which can consume the
time and resources of the court.
3. Jurisdiction by Consent
The district court, pursuant to section 157(c)(2), may refer a
noncore proceeding to the bankruptcy judge to hear and determine
with the consent of the parties. The bankruptcy court thus may
enter a final order on consent of the parties in noncore matters.
This creates two major issues. First, a lack of specificity exists re-
garding the concept of "consent." Some procedural guidelines are
needed to develop this concept. For example, the time and method
for manifesting consent needs clarification. Should there be a cut-
off time for parties to consent? Should a formal method be re-
quired to express consent? Rules should set forth precisely the
procedures so that the parties and judges all know with certainty
what to do and when. Similarly, if a deadline or a formal expres-
sion is not required, that should be stated. Certainty, regardless of
the merits, is necessary in such procedural matters; it is a provision
that will be used frequently.
The second issue requiring a basic policy consideration is the
proper manifestation of consent. Does the consent have to be ex-
pressed or may it be implied by failure to object?"3 This issue
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). As a matter of fact, the bankruptcy judge will have to
make the (b)(3) determination at some point in the proceeding. That determination sets in
motion either the appeal process of § 158 or the submission of proposed findings and conclu-
sions as required by § 157(c). Either the 10 day period for filing a notice of appeal will
commence, see BANKm R. 8002, or the time to object to the proposed findings or conclusions
will start to run. Such time, as of this writing, is set, if at all, by local rule.
23. A district court decision has held that consent under § 157(c)(2) can be implied.
Lombard-Wall Inc. v. N.Y.C. Housing Dev. Corp. (In re Lombard-Wall, Inc.), No. 82 B
[Vol. 38:675
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reestablishes an unsavory aspect of pre-1978 law, the delegation of
which was one of the basic reasons for promulgation of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978.24 Prior to the 1978 Code, one of the
avenues permitting the exercise of summary jurisdiction by refer-
ees in bankruptcy (who became bankruptcy judges in 1973) was
consent of the parties. Implied consent was possible and was
deemed to occur by a failure to object timely to the exercise of
summary jurisdiction.2 5 The notion had been spelled out in section
2a(7) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and was prescribed more fully
in Bankruptcy Rule 915 when the Rules went into effect in 1973.26
Section 2a(7) and Rule 915 required that an objection to the exer-
cise of summary jurisdiction had to be asserted in the answer to
the complaint or by motion.27
An underlying premise of the consent concept was that subject
matter jurisdiction was not at issue.28 Even though subject matter
jurisdiction could not be waived and its lack could be raised by
way of objection at any time, either collaterally or within the same
proceeding, the summary-plenary jurisdictional issue in bank-
ruptcy matters was more akin to personal jurisdiction, which could
be waived. Thus, the practice developed of requiring a timely ob-
jection, the absence of which was deemed to be consent to the ex-
ercise of summary jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court.2 9 Nothing
in the 1984 amendements or in the accompanying legislative his-
11556, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. 1985). This holding, along with other conclusions reached in the
opinion, is made without any legal analysis and may well be constitutionally unsound. It is
becoming apparent that district judges are in a rush to rid themselves of proceedings arising
in bankruptcy cases and have little or no regard for the 1984 legislation or the interests of
the parties in obtaining authoritative, well-analyzed rulings in their disputes. Those judges
were quick to bar the independence of the bankruptcy court but even quicker to assure that
bankruptcy judges do all the work whether or not in contravention of the Constitution or
the laws of the United States.
24. See supra note 10.
25. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRupTcy 23.08[4] (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978).
26. Section 2a(7) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided, in part:
[W]here in a controversy arising in a proceeding under this Act an adverse party does
not interpose objection to the summary jurisdiction of the court of bankruptcy, by an-
swer or motion filed before the expiration of the time prescribed by law or rule of court
. . . he shall be deemed to have consented to such jurisdiction.
Rule 915(a) of the 1973 Bankruptcy Rules provided: "a party waives objection to juris-
diction of an adversary proceeding or a contested matter and thereby consents to such juris-
diction if he does not make objection by a timely motion or answer, whichever is first
served."
27. See supra note 25.
28. See Seligson & King, Jurisdiction and Venue in Bankruptcy, 36 J. NAT'L ASS'N
REF IN BANKR. 36, 74 (1962).
29. See supra notes 25-28; see also supra note 10.
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tory indicates whether Congress intended implied consent to suf-
fice under section 157(c)(2).s
A provision in the Magistrates Act s' that is similar to section
157(c)(2) may prove instructive to the interpretation of section
157(c)(2). In the Magistrates Act provision, jurisdiction is given to
magistrates to enter final orders if the parties file an express, writ-
ten consent. A number of courts of appeals have upheld the consti-
tutionality of the statute on the basis of this consent feature.32 On
the first occasion that the statute was challenged, however, it was
held unconstitutional by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals." If
that opinion had not been overturned by the Ninth Circuit sitting
en banc,34 different bankruptcy legislation might be in effect today.
In any event, other circuits followed closely, in time and result, on
the heels of the en banc decision. 5
While many circuits have resolved the constitutionality of the
express consent provision in the Magistrates Act, the Supreme
Court has not yet spoken. Accordingly, section 157(c)(2) may be
subject to constitutional attack. Does it or does it not conform to
the plurality decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co.?3 6 Perhaps a requirement of express writ-
30. See Lombard-Wall Inc. v. N.Y.C. Housing Dev. Corp. (In re Lombard-Wall Inc.),
No. 82 B 11556, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (district court offered no analysis but permitted a
finding of consent by implication).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1982). For decisions interpreting the Magistrates Act, see infra
notes 33-36.
32. See infra note 35.
33. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 712 F.2d 1305 (9th
Cir. 1983).
34. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537 (9th
Cir. 1984) (en banc) (8-3 decision), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984).
35. See Fields v. Washington Met. Transit Auth., 743 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Geras
v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1984); Lehman Brothers Kuhn
Loeb, Inc. v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 739 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1984) (en bane), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 906 (1985); Campbell v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1984);
Puryear v. Ede's Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1984); Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 218 (1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 172 (1984); Williams v. Mussomelli, 722 F.2d 1130 (3d Cir. 1983); Whar-
ton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1983).
36. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of the
1978 Federal Magistrates Act in United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980), holding that
because the ultimate decisionmaking authority regarding all pretrial motions lay with the
district courts and not the magistrates, the Act did not violate article III of the Constitu-
tion. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 79. In Northern Pipeline, however, the Court stated
that although Congress possessed broad discretion to assign factfinding functions to an ad-
junct of the district court to aid in adjudicating congressionally created statutory rights, it
did not possess that same broad discretion with respect to rights not created by Congress.
Because the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 did not retain the essential attributes of judi-
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ten consent is itself constitutionally invalid. Certainly, the exis-
tence of rules permitting deemed or implied consent would consti-
tute a second rung of attack and would render the decisions under
the Magistrates Act less persuasive. If section 157(c)(2) provides
for deemed consent in any way, will too much jurisdiction, however
one defines "too much," be given to nonarticle III courts? These
are questions to which the Supreme Court will have to respond.
The consent issue also has an impact on appellate procedure.
First, because consent to jurisdiction will lead to entry of a final
order by the bankruptcy judge, the appellate procedure of section
158 and Part VIII of the Bankruptcy Rules, including the "clearly
erroneous" doctrine, 37 are applicable. Second, section 158 provides
for the establishment of bankruptcy appellate panels similar to
those provided for under the 1978 Code. One major difference from
the prior practice under the 1978 Code, however, has been insti-
tuted. Once bankruptcy appellate panels are established by the ju-
dicial council of the circuit and referral to such panels is approved
by majority vote of all district judges of the circuit, the parties to
the appeal must agree unanimously to use the panel instead of ap-
pealing to the district court. Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, party consent was immaterial.3 If the appellate panel was
established, the district court had no appellate jurisdiction. That is
no longer true under section 158. Only the district court has appel-
late jurisdiction unless the parties to the appeal consent to the ju-
risdiction of the bankruptcy appellate panel.
The legislative history to the 1984 amendments does not ex-
plain the added requirement of the parties' consent to the use of
appellate panels. It may have been included to bolster the consti-
tutional validity of the entire legislative scheme. At the trial level,
it is possible in two instances for a party's rights to be adjudicated
by the nonarticle III bankruptcy judge: either in a core proceeding
pursuant to section 157(b)(1), or by consent in a noncore proceed-
ing pursuant to section 157(c)(2). If the judicial council of the cir-
cuit establishes appellate panels of bankruptcy judges, this level of
appeal also is handled by nonarticle III judges. Perhaps, in an
overabundance of caution, Congress saw fit not to impose a nonar-
ticle III appellate tribunal, but to permit its use only if all the par-
cial power in an article III court, but instead vested such judicial power in an adjunct to the
district court, it was unconstitutional. 458 U.S. at 87.
37. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 8013, findings of fact of the bankruptcy judge shall
not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.
38. 28 U.S.C. §§ 160, 1334(a), 1482 (1982).
19851
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
ties were of the same mind. As indicated previously, however, con-
sent may not be the relevant ingredient. If such broad jurisdiction
cannot be given validly to the nonarticle III court, consent would
be irrelevant and the 1984 amendments to Title 28 should suffer
the same fate as the jurisdictional provisions of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978.39
One final lesson from Northern Pipeline may have some im-
plications on the validity of the consent feature. As stated earlier,
consent was one of the avenues for conferring summary jurisdic-
tion on the bankruptcy court under the pre-1978 law. The Su-
preme Court never had ruled on the constitutionality of the exer-
cise of summary jurisdiction, that is, when summary jurisdiction
could be exercised or if the bankruptcy court had sufficient power
to exercise it at all. Footnote 31 in Justice Brennan's opinion in
Northern Pipeline calls into question the constitutionality of the
entire prior judicial system in bankruptcy matters.40 No one can
foretell how the Supreme Court will construe the 1984 amend-
ments, but responsible legislators should have avoided a substan-
tial risk of a constitutional defect which easily could have been ac-
complished by establishing an article III bankruptcy court.
B. Core Proceedings
Thus far, this Article has discussed the jurisdictional issues
arising under section 157 even though that section is entitled "Pro-
cedures." On the procedural front, section 157 contains the bare
necessaries; many gaps have to be filled in by local court rules, and
ultimately, by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. Both for
jurisdictional and procedural analysis, it is necessary to consider
section 157(b)(2), because it, together with subsections (b)(1),
(c)(1), and (b)(3) of section 157, pose a key question concerning
the bankruptcy judge's power: what is a core proceeding?
39. While the 1984 amendments are in operation, however, the use of appellate panels
may encourage another layer of litigation strategy. The decision to agree to the appellate
panel route or to insist on use of the district court may have nothing to do with the merits
of either process, but instead may reflect whatever tactical benefits or advantages counsel
may perceive.
40. Justice Brennan stated:
Appellants and Justice White's dissent also rely on the broad powers exercised by the
bankruptcy referees immediately before the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 .... But those
particular adjunct functions, which represent the culmination of years of gradual ex-
pansion of the power and authority of the bankruptcy referee, see 1 Collier, supra n.3,
at 11.02, have never been explicitly endorsed by this Court.
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 79 n.31 (citation omitted).
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Clauses A through 0 of section 157(b)(2) set forth a long laun-
dry list of matters delineated as core proceedings. 41 This listing,
together with subsection (b)(1), in effect grants broad and perva-
sive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court, thereby calling into ques-
tion the constitutional validity of the 1984 amendments under
Northern Pipeline. Even a cursory analysis of section 157(b)(2)
reveals that the general scope of core proceedings is questionable.
One significant feature of section 157(b)(2) is that it contains
at least four catch-all phrases. Congress probably intended to be
overly protective against a court holding that the section was in-
tended to be an exclusive list. Subsection (b)(2) begins by provid-
ing what core proceedings "include." As used in both the Bank-
ruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy Act, the word "means" in a
definitional section is exclusive, but the word "include" is nonex-
clusive.42 Therefore, the use of the term "include" would have it-
self been a sufficient safeguard. But the drafters added "are not
limited to." Thus, without even considering the specific items in
the list, the provision clearly was worded adequately to preclude
any interpretation of the list as being exclusive. Nonetheless, a
third nonexclusivity feature is contained in the first item in section
41. Section 157(b)(2)(A)-(O) provides as follows:
(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to-
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions from
property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interest [sic] for the purposes of
confirming a plan under chapter 11 or 13 of title 11 but not the liquidation or estima-
tion of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against
the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash
collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from
claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against the
estate; and
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the
adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship, except
personal injury tort or wrongful death claims.
42. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 1 101.00[2] (L. King 15th ed. 1984).
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157(b)(2): "(A) matters concerning the administration of the es-
tate." While estate administration matters are not defined, the
clause appears to contemplate a very broad panoply of proceedings
integral to a case under the Code. Its overbreadth may, in fact,
render the remaining clauses unnecessary. Other items in subsec-
tion (b)(2), such as objections to discharge and allowance of claims,
are listed separately but easily could be considered matters con-
cerning the administration of the estate.
Section 157(b)(2)'s final catch-all, clause (0), which is the last
clause in this listing, includes "proceedings affecting the liquida-
tion of the assets of the estate." Matters of administration are, as
noted, core proceedings. Additionally, proceedings affecting the
liquidation of the assets of the estate also are core proceedings.
Anything can be included under clauses (A) and (0) taken to-
gether, and they certainly would have been sufficient. But clause
(0) continues. It is not limited to matters affecting liquidation, but
goes on to add proceedings affecting the adjustment of the debtor-
creditor or debtor-shareholder relationship. What possibly could
be overlooked by these four catch-all provisions? Why are clauses
(B) through (N)-and for that matter clause (0)-even needed?
One may conclude that Congress intended to make as clear as it
could those matters that should be considered within the jurisdic-
tion of the nonarticle III bankruptcy court. This would enable
bankruptcy courts to enter final orders and would leave very little
for the district court to do in the bankruptcy arena. These clauses
alone appear to give the bankruptcy courts all the pervasive juris-
diction formerly granted by section 1471(b) and (c). 43
The listings in section 157(b) (2) do not indicate that the bank-
43. Compare the procedureal scheme set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1471:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a
court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but
not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or
related to cases under title 11.
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 is com-
menced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the district
courts.
(d) Subsection (b) or (c) of this section does not prevent a district court or a bank-
ruptcy court, in the interest of justice, from abstaining from hearing a particular pro-
ceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11. Such
abstention, or a decision not to abstain, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
(e) The bankruptcy court in which a case under title 11 is commenced shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor, as of the
commencement of such case.
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ruptcy court would not have jurisdiction over the Northern Pipe-
line cause of action if it had arisen under the 1984 amendments.
One could argue that it would be a core proceeding. It certainly
affects the liquidation of the assets of the estate. The Chapter 11
debtor in Northern Pipeline sued for breach of contract. The cause
of action (a chose in action) was an asset of the estate and had to
be liquidated. Northern Pipeline, the Chapter 11 debtor, had sued
Marathon for breach of contract. It is therefore likely that the pro-
ceeding also affected the adjustment of the debtor-creditor rela-
tionship. If the breach of contract action would be a core proceed-
ing under the 1984 amendments, Congress has not complied with
the Supreme Court's mandate and has enacted a constitutionally
invalid statute."
The next major item listed as a core proceeding is the allow-
ance or disallowance of claims against the estate.45 As mentioned,
one could consider this item as part of the administration of the
estate. A key element in any type of case under the Code, whether
a Chapter 7, 9, 11, or 13 case, is the filing of a proof of claim.
Under both the Code and the Rules, if no party in interest objects,
a claim is deemed allowed. 6 Judges do not have to hold hearings
44. See also supra note 10. Some courts have held that certain actions by the debtor,
including actions to collect an account receivable, are too similar to the cause of action
involved in the Northern Pipeline case and are, therefore, noncore proceedings. See Mo-
hawk Indus. v. Robinson Indus., 46 Bankr. 464 (D. Mass. 1985) (action against supplier for
breach of warranties); In re Pierce, 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2D (MB) 1036 (D. Colo. 1984)
(action against lessor for breach of lease); In re Atlas Automation, Inc., 42 Bankr. 246
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) (action to collect accounts receivable).
Other courts have held, however, that § 157(b)(2) is clearly stated and such actions by a
debtor affect the debtor-creditor relationship, involve assets of the estate that require liqui-
dation (clause (0)), or involve property of the estate that is subject to a turnover proceeding
under clause (E). See Lesser v. A-Z Assocs. (In re Lion Capital Group), No. 84-B-10668-72
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed 1985) (proceeding to collect capital contributions from limited part-
ners); Baldwin-United Corp. v. Thompson (In re Baldwin-United Corp.), No. 1-83-02495
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio filed 1985) (action to collect promissory note). In Baldwin-United Corp.
the court said that actions to collect accounts receivable traditionally were pursued in the
bankruptcy court. This is not accurate. Prior to 1978 trustees brought suit in the bank-
ruptcy court in the hope that the defendant would not object in its answer or by motion and
thereby waive the lack of summary jurisdiction. This was one of the abusive practices that
the 1978 Code attempted to eliminate from the system. On proper and timely objection
there was no summary jurisdiction to entertain an action to collect accounts receivable. See
2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY at 492 n.33 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1974). As mentioned, there is now
ample authority in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) to determine that such actions are core proceed-
ings. If such a determination is made, however, the next step is to declare the jurisdictional
scheme of the 1984 amendments unconstitutional under the authority of Northern Pipeline.
45. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, § 104(a), 98 Stat. 333, 340 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B)).
46. 11 U.S.C. § 502 provides that a proof of claim is deemed allowed unless a party in
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and enter orders allowing claims in the absence of objections. An
order is entered only when an objection is filed to the allowance of
a claim. If an objection is raised, a hearing is held resulting in an
order of either allowance or disallowance.
Section 5011 of the Code provides that a timely proof of claim
may be filed.47 Rule 3002 specifies the time for filing a proof of
claim, and Rule 3001 specifies the form and place for filing a proof
of claim. These are routine, normal, formalistic matters that are
within the administration of any type of case under the Code.
Aside from objections to form and time of filing, any other dis-
putes concerning a proof of claim raised by objection are not mat-
ters of bankruptcy law. State law or nonbankruptcy federal law
usually governs. For example, there is no bankruptcy law with re-
spect to liability on a loan or other contract.48 This raises a ques-
tion: does the underlying need for interpretation or application of
state law affect the decision whether a matter is a core or noncore
proceeding? Congress clearly did not intend any such effect be-
cause, pursuant to section 157(b)(3), that factor alone is not deter-
minative in classifying a proceeding as core or noncore. 49
Clause (C) of section 157(b)(2) raises additional problems in
connection with the issue of the allowance and disallowance of
claims. That clause lists counterclaims by the estate against per-
sons filing claims as core proceedings. Suppose that Marathon had
filed a claim in Northern Pipeline's Chapter 11 case as a creditor.
Clause (C) provides that Northern Pipeline's counterclaim against
Marathon for damages flowing from the alleged breach of contract
would be a core proceeding in which the bankruptcy court may
enter a final order. In other words, the 1984 amendments appear to
interest, including the trustee, objects. Rule 3001(f) provides that a properly executed and
filed proof of claim constitutes "prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the
claim."
47. While 11 U.S.C. § 501 is stated permissively, if an unsecured creditor desires to
participate in any distribution, a proof of claim must be filed in a Chapter 7 or 13 case or
must be deemed filed in a Chapter 11 case. See 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1982).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (1982) renders nonallowable a claim that is unenforceable
against the debtor under applicable law. Thus, if the creditor could not have recovered
against the debtor absent the case under the Code, the trustee may use the same reason to
object to the allowance of the claim. Normally, any such reason would be based on state law.
49. Whether Congress has properly read the Supreme Court's decision in Northern
Pipeline is an open question until the Court decides the validity of the 1984 amendments.
Many of the matters listed as core proceedings, determinable by the nonarticle HI bank-
ruptcy judge, depend upon the application and interpretation of state law and do not in-
volve federal bankruptcy law at all. Congress' conclusion in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3) to the
contrary notwithstanding, the entire scheme of subsection (b)(2) may well be defective
constitutionally.
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permit the same proceeding, involving the same issues, to be
within the jurisdiction of the nonarticle III court irrespective of the
Supreme Court's holding in Northern Pipeline. This example dem-
onstrates another way in which a "Northern Pipeline II" may
come to the Supreme Court to test the 1984 amendments. The
Court may well be indifferent to whether the action arises as a
counterclaim rather than as an original claim in determining the
constitutional powers of a nonarticle III court. Aside from language
and cosmetics, Congress appears to have re-created the jurisdic-
tional scheme of former section 1471(b) and (c) in the 1984
amendments.
Clause (C) also relates to the concept of implied consent. An
important issue under pre-1978 law was whether the bankruptcy
court had summary jurisdiction to decide counterclaims raised by
the trustee after a creditor had filed a proof of claim. Two lines of
thought developed that depended on the type of counterclaim con-
cerned. Case law created a general principle that if the counter-
claim was in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim (as in Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 13), the bankruptcy court had
summary jurisdiction to determine it.50 The other line of thought
involved permissive counterclaims arising out of different transac-
tions. This line was in a state of development in the courts when
the 1978 Code was enacted. The cases were mixed on whether sum-
mary jurisdiction existed for permissive counterclaims 5 1 and the
Supreme Court had not ruled. The important factor is that the law
was in a state of flux. Now, however, Congress seems to have re-
solved the issue. The word used in clause (C) is "counterclaims."
Clause (C) does not distinguish between compulsory and permis-
sive counterclaims. Unless clause (C) is otherwise limited to com-
pulsory counterclaims, the cause of action in Northern Pipeline, if
raised in a counterclaim, would be a core proceeding. It appears
doubtful that the authority of the bankruptcy court to enter a final
order would be upheld by the Supreme Court because such author-
ity seems clearly inconsistent with the Court's ruling in Northern
Pipeline.2 This demonstrates yet another provision that raises a
50. See, e.g., In re Carnell Constr. Co., 424 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1970); Cherno v. Engine
Air Serv., Inc., 330 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1964); see also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 23.08, at
557-60 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978); Seligson & King, Jurisdiction and Venue in Bankruptcy,
36 J. NAT'L ASS'N REF. IN BANKR. 76-84 (1962).
51. See Seligson & King, supra note 50, at 78-80; 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 50, at 557-60.
52. Counterclaim jurisdiction may be totally at risk constitutionally. See Schor v.
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constitutional issue affecting the entire statute.
Clause (C) also raises a matter concerning litigation strategy.
One of the major benefits of the 1978 Code was the elimination of
the practice of jurisdiction by entrapment or by ambush. Pursuant
to pre-1978 law, many creditors hesitated to file a proof of claim
because of certain unpredictable consequences. Attorneys for cred-
itors feared that, by filing a proof of claim, the creditor would be
submitting to the exercise of summary jurisdiction for something
that it did not necessarily want adjudicated by the bankruptcy
court. But the pervasive jurisdiction under the 1978 Code made it
unnecessary to worry about filing a proof of claim. No consequence
relating to jurisdiction flowed from that act.
The 1984 amendments may have re-created such strategic con-
siderations. The Supreme Court in Katchen v. Landy53 decided
that, under pre-1978 law, the filing of a proof of claim submitted
the creditor to summary jurisdiction with respect to any prefer-
ence-recovery action. Fortunately, the problem may not be as
broad as it was earlier because of the distinctions existing between
current law and that interpreted by the Court in Katchen. Unlike
pre-1978 law, preferences are treated separately in section
157(b)(2)(F). They do not come within the counterclaim provision
because recovery of a preference is specifically listed as a core pro-
ceeding. In other situations, however, the counterclaim provision
does raise the spectre of jurisdiction by ambush, because the full
play of the bankruptcy court's authority arises merely with a credi-
tor's filing of a proof of claim.
It may even be that the grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy
court over classic bankruptcy actions to recover preferences and
fraudulent transfers overreaches the guidelines set forth in the Su-
preme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline. Prior to the 1978
Code, these actions were not automatically within the province of
the bankruptcy court. They were within the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court sitting as a bankruptcy court or the state court that had
concurrent jurisdiction under sections 23, 60, and 70 of the former
Bankruptcy Act. As mentioned, Katchen v. Landy held that bank-
ruptcy court jurisdiction arose when the creditor-transferee filed a
proof of claim. The 1984 amendments now provide, however, that
the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to enter final orders in all
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 740 F.2d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (administrative law
judge may not adjudicate counterclaims not involving Commodity Exchange Act).
53. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
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such actions.5 4 Fraudulent transfer actions can arise under two
governing sections. Section 548 gives rise to a trustee's power, qua
trustee, to contest a transfer as fraudulent, 5 and pursuant to sec-
tion 544(b), the trustee succeeds to the rights of unsecured credi-
tors with allowable claims. If there is any creditor who can, under
state law, contest a prebankruptcy transfer as fraudulent, the trus-
tee may assert that right and bring the action. Pursuant to section
157(b)(2)(H), actions under both sections 548 and 544(b) can be
brought in the bankruptcy court for entry of final orders. It is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to perceive any conceptual difference be-
tween the trustee's use of an individual creditor's right to sue
under section 544(b) and the debtor suing for breach of contract as
it did in Northern Pipeline.
Section 157(b)(2)(B) contains an important exception that bi-
furcates jurisdiction with respect to a personal injury tort claim,
depending on the purpose for which adjudication of the claim is
necessary."1 A proceeding for the liquidation or estimation of a
contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death
claim for the purpose of distribution or entitlement to distribution
in, for example, a Chapter 11 case, is not a core proceeding al-
though the injured person is required to file a proof of claim that
will be allowed or disallowed. It may be necessary to have a deter-
mination of liability in order to conclude whether a class has ac-
cepted or rejected a plan by the requisite majorities for purposes of
confirmation. This need to determine liability or the extent of lia-
bility arises in a Chapter 11 or 13 case but not in a Chapter 7
liquidation case. For purposes of confirming a plan, the adjudica-
tion of liability would be a core proceeding subject to entry of a
final order by the bankruptcy judge. For distribution purposes,
54. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 104(a), 98 Stat. 333, 340 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F), (H) and possibly (K)).
One court reached the misplaced conclusion that the preference provision is unconstitu-
tional on the theory that such actions cannot be heard by a nonarticle III judge. See In re
Associated Grocers of Neb. Coop., 12 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 737 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1984).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982) gives the trustee power to avoid fraudulent transfers made
within one year prior to the commencement of the Title 11 case.
56. Section 157(b)(2)(B) of the 1984 amendments provides that core proceedings in-
clude the
allowance or disallowance or claims against the estate. . . and estimation of claims or
interest [sic] for the purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11 or 13 of title 11
but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort
or wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under
title 11.
Id.
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however, the adjudication of liability is not a core proceeding and,
therefore, the bankruptcy court cannot enter a final order.
The fact that the bankruptcy court may not enter a final order
when a trial is necessary for distribution purposes does not mean it
becomes a noncore proceeding under subsection (c)(1) in which the
bankruptcy court may only submit proposed findings and conclu-
sions. The bankruptcy court is not permitted to be involved at all.
Paragraph (5) of section 157(b) provides for the direct and nondel-
egable involvement of the district court. It states not only that the
district court shall determine where the personal injury action
shall be tried, but it greatly limits the alternatives available to that
court. Section 157(b)(5) permits the action to be tried only in a
federal district court and may not be tried in a bankruptcy or state
court. The district court for the district in which the Code case is
pending is required to decide either that the personal injury action
will be tried there or in the district court located in the district in
which the claim arose.57
Two other factors also relate to the bifurcated jurisdiction
under section 157(b)(2)(B). First, the jury trial provision, as
amended in 1984,58 retains the right to trial by jury in bankruptcy
cases only in personal injury actions. Personal injury actions are
triable only in the federal district court under section 157(b)(5);
accordingly, a jury trial may take place only in the district court.
Second, because section 157(b)(5) specifically provides for these
57. Two courts have held that while § 157(b)(5) requires trial by the district court,
that does not mean that a trial will be necessary immediately or in every situation involving
a personal injury tort claim. See In re UNR Indus., Inc., 11 COLLIER BANKI. CAS. 2D (MB)
687 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984); see also In re Revere Copper & Brass Inc., Nos. 83 B 10791, 82 B 12077 to 12086, slip
op. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1984) (decision involving § 157(d) but the theory was the same: in
the absence of a dispute there is nothing to withdraw from the bankruptcy court). The
subsection becomes applicable only when a trial becomes necessary and not before. The
mere fact that a proof of claim is filed does not automatically mandate a trial. There may
not be an objection fied to the claim or it may be settled through negotiation, particularly
through negotiation with Chapter 11 classes of creditors or claimants in connection with a
plan. Procedurally, nothing in the amendments requires a change from the usual claim filing
method pursuant to § 501 of the Code and Rules 3001, 3002, and 3003. If an issue is joined,
however, and trial becomes necessary, it must be held in the district court.
Since the personal injury action is not even a noncore proceeding, the district judge
may not re-refer the matter to the bankruptcy judge for trial. The district judge may, how-
ever, refer whatever can be referred to a magistrate pursuant to the Magistrates Act. The
only power to refer to a bankruptcy judge is 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), but § 157(b)(5) provides in
essence that the bankruptcy judge may not try this type of action.
58. Section 1411(a) of the 1984 amendments provides, in part: "this chapter and title
11 do not affect any right to trial by jury that an individual has under applicable nonban-
kruptcy law with regard to a personal injury or wrongful death tort claim." Id.
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claims to be tried in the federal district court, the mandatory ab-
stention feature of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) is inapplicable.59 These
related provisions emphasize Congress' directive that the district
court shall try these types of claims and not the bankruptcy court
under the reference of section 157(a), whether through the special
master process or by the designation of the bankruptcy judge as a
magistrate, for which the authority otherwise would exist.
The bifurcated jurisdiction can give rise to inconsistent judg-
ments. The same action may be tried before both the bankruptcy
judge and the district judge. These judges may reach different con-
clusions. Nothing indicates that the doctrine of res judicata or even
collateral estoppel is relevant. In fact, the application of either
doctrine would undermine Congress' intent to use two different
courts for the two different purposes set forth in the statute.60
C. Withdrawal of Cases and Proceedings
In accordance with the perceived need to have some supervi-
sion of the article I bankruptcy court by the article III district
court, section 157(d) contains provisions permitting, and under
some circumstances requiring, withdrawal of cases and proceedings
or parts thereof from the bankruptcy court.6' The first sentence of
subsection (d) permits withdrawal on timely motion of a party or
on the district court's own motion, in each case for cause shown.
The second sentence requires withdrawal under certain specified
circumstances. Several observations may be made about both
sentences.
1. Permissive Withdrawal
Although the first sentence of section 157(d) allows withdrawal
as a matter of discretion, cause must be shown. Even though the
district judge may withdraw a case or proceeding sua sponte, cause
59. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, § 104(a), 98 Stat. 333, 341 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(4)).
60. Nondischargeability of a debt is a core proceeding under § 157(b)(2)(I). But if
liability falls under § 157(b)(5) the whole proceeding should be heard by the district court.
In re Lagrotteria, 12 BANK& CT. DEc. (CRR) 457 (Bankr. N.D. ll. 1984).
61. Section 157(d) of the 1984 amendments provides:
The district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding referred
under this section, on its own motion or on timely motion of any party, for cause
shown. The district court shall, on timely motion of a party, so withdraw a proceeding
if the court determines that resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both
title 11 and other laws of the United States regulating organizations or activities affect-
ing interstate commerce.
1985]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:675
must still be shown, that is, the district judge in some manner
must specify a sound reason for withdrawal. It is disconcerting that
a party disfavoring withdrawal will be at a distinct disadvantage,
because it will have to contest the action of the arbiter who will
decide the contest.
Nothing in the legislation or otherwise indicates what may
constitute cause. One form of cause may be a subsequent order to
abstain, issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) or (2).2 Thus
withdrawal may be used as the first step in transferring a proceed-
ing from the bankruptcy court to, ultimately, the state court.6 3
2. Mandatory Withdrawal
The second sentence of section 157(d) requires withdrawal of a
proceeding on timely motion of a party if both the Bankruptcy
Code and another federal law "regulating organizations or activi-
ties affecting interstate commerce" must be considered to resolve
the proceeding.6 4 This provision had no counterpart in the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 or the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Appar-
ently, it represents a congressional concern incited by lobbyists for
private interest groups that bankruptcy courts either cannot or
should not interpret nonbankruptcy federal laws. Regardless of
62. Section 1334(c)(1) and (2) of the 1984 amendments states:
(c)(1) Nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of justice, or
in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law, from abstaining
from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a
case under title 11.
(2) Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law claim or
State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but not arising under title 11
or arising in a case under title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been
commenced in a court of the United States absent jurisdiction under this section, the
district court shall abstain from hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced,
and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction. Any deci-
sion to abstain made under this subsection is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
This subsection shall not be construed to limit the applicability of the stay provided
for by section 362 of title 11, United States Code, as such section applies to an action
affecting the property of the estate in bankruptcy.
63. The first sentence of § 157(d) requires a motion made by a party to be timely.
Again, the statute does not indicate what constitutes a timely motion. Presumably, the stan-
dards of timeliness are left for determination by bankruptcy rules.
It would seem that a demand for trial by jury should not be deemed cause for with-
drawal of a proceeding from the bankruptcy judge. 28 U.S.C. § 1411(a) limits the right to
trial by jury to personal injury and wrongful death tort actions which, as indicated in the
text, are tried in the district court and are not subject to withdrawal in any event. See supra
note 58 for text of § 1411(a).
64. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 104(a), 98 Stat. 333, 341 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 157(d)).
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Congress' reason for passing it, the mandatory withdrawal feature
should receive little actual use in the courts. Some examples may
be informative.
Labor union lawyers conceivably would regard section 157(d)
as requiring withdrawal of a proceeding to reject a collective bar-
gaining agreement in a Chapter 11 case pursuant to section 1113 of
the Bankruptcy Code. In order to reject such a contract section
1113 must be considered, because its requirements are conditions
precedent to the court's permitting rejection. But federal labor law
clearly is not involved. Both the Supreme Court, in NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco,65 and Congress, in section 1113, have said that,
with regard to permission to reject collective bargaining agree-
ments, 6 the Bankruptcy Code supersedes the labor laws. Thus,
nothing in the National Labor Relations Act must be considered. If
the particular matter required interpretation and application of
some part of the labor law, then both laws would be involved and
mandatory withdrawal could be raised. But that would not be the
routine situation.
Another example is an action brought under the antitrust laws
for treble damages. In order to resolve that proceeding the anti-
trust laws must be interpreted to determine if there was a viola-
tion, if there is liability, and the extent of damages. But that is
only one-half of the issue. In order to trigger mandatory with-
drawal, Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code also must be considered
to resolve the proceeding. Yet nothing in the Bankruptcy Code
must be considered in order to resolve the proceeding based on the
antitrust laws. The debtor, if it is the plaintiff, either is or is not
entitled to damages. If the creditor brings the action against the
debtor, the claim will be allowed or disallowed, but on the basis of
the antitrust laws and not on the basis of the Bankruptcy Code.
When one properly analyzes section 157(d), it becomes appar-
ent that very few, if any, proceedings will require consideration of
both sets of laws and thereby cause mandatory withdrawal. In In
re White Motor Corp.,'7 the district court applied the provision on
65. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982) covers the assumption and rejection of executory contracts
generally, but 11 U.S.C. § 1113, which was added by the 1984 amendments, covers the treat-
ment of collective bargaining agreements specifically.
67. 42 Bankr. 693 (N.D. Ohio 1984). The court found little legislative history pertain-
ing to § 157(d).
On the floor of the Senate, Senators Dole and Heflin virtually repeated the language of
the subsection without explanation. What is interesting, however, is that both referred only
to the district judge as the one to withdraw a proceeding. No mention was made of the
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a quantitative basis. Both ERISA and the Code were involved. The
court concluded that what was required primarily was considera-
tion of the bankruptcy law. The court held that section 157(d) does
not require withdrawal unless resolution of the dispute requires
substantial and material consideration of federal law other than
the Bankruptcy Code. Section 157(d) is not to be construed as an
escape hatch through which most disputes can flow from the bank-
ruptcy court to the district court.
3. Motions for Withdrawal
A major concern of the bankruptcy bar is where to bring a
motion for withdrawal. In considering where a motion for with-
drawal should be lodged and heard, as between the bankruptcy
court and the district court, one finds in section 157 a convoluted
and disorganized system. The statute clearly and succinctly states
that the district court may withdraw a case or proceeding pursuant
to section 157(d). It also explicitly states that the district court
may, and under some circumstances must, abstain from hearing a
particular proceeding, thus leaving it to a state court for adjudica-
tion.68 The two subsections that confuse the system are (b)(3) and
(a) of section 157. Subsection (b)(3) provides that the bankruptcy
court,es not the district court, shall determine whether a proceed-
ing is a core or a noncore proceeding. In terms of efficiency of ad-
ministration with regard to the courts, counsel, and the parties, it
would be most reasonable for the bankruptcy court also to deter-
mine any motion for withdrawal or abstention. As already indi-
bankruptcy judge's authority to do so. 130 CONG. REc. S6085-87 (daily ed. May 21, 1984)
(statements of Sens. Dole and Heflin). In discussing an earlier version of the bill, S. 1013,
the Senate Report states: "The district court thus retains full power to withdraw or limit
the reference of a bankruptcy case or proceeding to the bankruptcy court at any time for
any reason." S. REP. No. 55, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1983).
Senator DeConcini referred to withdrawal in the following terms:
The district court should withdraw such proceedings only if the court determines that
the assertion that other laws regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate
commerce are in fact likely to be considered, and should not allow a party to use this
provision to require withdrawal where such laws are not material to resolution of the
proceeding.
130 CONG. REC. S7622 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (statement by Sen. DeConcini) (speaking of
mandatory withdrawal).
68. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 101(a), 98 Stat 333, 333 (to be codified at 23 U.S.C. § 1334(c)); see supra note 67.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3) does not use the word "court" but uses "judge." Some argue
there is no longer any bankruptcy court. This is called selective reading. 28 U.S.C. § 151
constitutes the bankruptcy judges of the district as a unit of the district court "to be known
as the bankruptcy court for that district." Yes, Virginia, there is a bankruptcy court.
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cated, subsection (a) of section 157 permits the district court to
refer all cases and proceedings to the bankruptcy court. If the dis-
trict court has made such a reference, are motions to withdraw and
abstain necessarily included? If they are included, why does sub-
section (d) specify that the district court must withdraw in some
instances and may withdraw in other instances on its own motion?
Other procedural difficulties have become apparent. A party
may bring a motion in the district court even though all the pro-
ceedings in the case have been under the supervision of the bank-
ruptcy court. The district court where the motion is brought will
not know what has been happening in the case. Additionally, the
statute does not provide the bankruptcy court with a way of learn-
ing that such a motion has been made and that the district court is
considering it. The courts, the Administrative Office of the United
States courts, or the Bankruptcy Rules Committee can develop
procedures that would involve and inform both the clerk of the
district court and the clerk of the bankruptcy court in districts
where there is a separation in the paper-handling process.70 But
however well the procedure may be worked out, the mere decision
to place the responsibility with the district court automatically cre-
ates time delays in reaching results in the particular proceeding,
which can have an adverse effect on the progress of the case itself.
While the district court hears a motion for withdrawal, is the pro-
ceeding pending before the bankruptcy judge stayed? Absent a
stay order, the proceeding may continue. Rules should be drawn to
treat this situation similarly to stays pending appeal.7 1
Another difficulty is whether to classify the proceedings for
withdrawal and abstention as core or noncore proceedings if they
are heard by a bankruptcy court. If they are core proceedings and
the bankruptcy court thus may enter a final order, one would
surmise that such an order is interlocutory in nature and not sub-
ject to appeal as of right.7 2 Additionally, an order granting a mo-
70. Bankruptcy courts may or may not have a separate bankruptcy clerk's office in a
particular district. Section 156(b) of the 1984 amendments permits bankruptcy judges to
appoint a clerk for the bankruptcy court of the district if the bankruptcy judges certify that
the number of cases and proceedings pending under § 1334 warrant a separate clerk's office.
Absent a certification, the district court clerk's office will also serve the bankruptcy court.
71. See, e.g., BANK& R. 7002 and 8005.
72. This would be the conclusion with respect to an order denying a motion to with-
draw or abstain. It might not be considered interlocutory if the bankruptcy court granted
the motion. A decision to abstain, however, is not appealable. See Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 101(a), 98 Stat. 333, 333 (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2)). This section refers only to the district court but if §
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tion to abstain is, pursuant to section 1334(c)(2), not reviewable by
appeal or otherwise. Thus, the bankruptcy judge's order would not
be appealable, a consequence hardly contemplated by Congress. If
a motion to withdraw or abstain is deemed a noncore proceeding,
the bankruptcy court may enter only proposed findings and con-
clusions. The district court still has the responsibility to enter the
final order. Thus, the district court might as well have heard the
motion in the first place. Section 157 provides no help in determin-
ing the characterization of the motions. This lack of clarification
itself may indicate that Congress meant what it wrote: the motions
to withdraw and abstain are to be filed and heard in the district
court.
D. Abstention
Section 1334(c)(1) provides for discretionary abstention. This
provision varies little from former section 1471(d) ,7 which was re-
pealed by the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984.74 One difference
in the two provisions, however, is that abstention formerly was
within the province of the bankruptcy court. The present language
refers to the district court exclusively.
Section 1334(c)(2) is new. It requires abstention if a number of
requirements coexist. Section 1334(c)(2) is not self-executing, and
there is no provision for the court to act on its own motion as there
is with respect to withdrawal. The requirements are of such a na-
ture, however, as to limit considerably the occasions for use of sub-
section (c)(2). Rarely will they all be present. The first requirement
is a timely motion of a party to the proceeding. Again, the statute
does not define a timely motion but, presumably, leaves that for
the rules to prescribe. If a motion is made too late by whatever
standards, is it precluded or may it be considered under subsection
(c)(1) for discretionary abstention? It would appear possible to
consider it under subsection (c)(1), but the court does not have to
grant the motion. In any event, mandatory abstention does not in-
158(d) authorizes the bankruptcy court to hear an abstention motion and enter a final order,
that order also would not be appealable. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judge-
ship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 104(a), 98 Stat. 333, 341 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)) ("The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals
from final judgments, orders, and decrees, and, with leave of the court, from interlocutory
orders and decrees, of bankruptcy judges.") See also 1 COLLmR ON BANKRUPTCY T 3.03[7][d]
(L. King 15th ed. 1980).
73. Former 28 U.S.C. § 1471(d) provided that a district court or a bankruptcy court, in
the interest of justice, could abstain from hearing a particular proceeding.
74. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (effectively repealing 28 U.S.C. § 1471(d)).
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volve a jurisdictional issue. If no timely motion is made, but all the
other requirements are present, abstention is not mandated.
How does abstention work procedurally? In an adversary pro-
ceeding the trustee or debtor in possession files a complaint under
Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules.75 The complaint is filed in the
bankruptcy court because of the reference that was made automat-
ically under section 157(a). 76 Assume that the defendant believes
that the requirements for mandatory abstention are present. Con-
gress seems to have created a system requiring a motion for with-
drawal to the district court, which would be discretionary, and an
attached motion for mandatory abstention alleging cause.
The statute has another ambiguous procedure for mandatory
abstention. Suppose that no action was pending in the state court
before the Code case was filed. The language in section 1334(c)(2)
states that the district court shall abstain from hearing such pro-
ceeding if an action "is commenced. . . in a state forum of appro-
priate jurisdiction." This language does not make clear whether
the state action must have been commenced prior to the Code
case. For the most part, it is unlikely that a party will commence
an action in state court after the commencement of the Code
case.77 This provision will be more applicable, if at all, to situations
in which a prepetition proceeding is pending in the state court.
Mandatory abstention also requires that the proceeding be
based on a state law claim or cause of action. One may consider
whether the cause of action asserted in Northern Pipeline would
have been subject to mandatory abstention. That cause of action
was based on breach of contract, which was a state law cause of
action related to a case under Title 11 but that did not arise under
Title 11 or in a case under Title 11. State law proceedings that fall
within the enumerated core proceedings of section 157(b)(2) could
become the subject of the mandatory abstention provisions of sec-
tion 157(d). Arguably, however, the language "related to a case
under title 11" in section 157(a) could exclude core proceedings in
75. Part VII of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure prescribes the procedure to be
followed in adversary proceedings. Rule 7001 sets forth a list of matters denoted as adver-
sary proceedings.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
77. If the debtor is the plaintiff, it normally would bring the action in the bankruptcy
court rather than the state court because, if for no other reason, there would be less delay in
obtaining a resolution of the proceeding. If the cause of action belongs to the third party,
that party would be stayed from commencing an action in state court by the operation of 11
U.S.C. § 362(a). The appropriate procedure would be to file a proof of claim in the bank-
ruptcy court setting forth the basis of the alleged liability of the debtor.
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section 157(b)(2) from mandatory abstention even though many of
the matters there listed are based on state law considerations or
essentially are state law causes of action.
Mandatory abstention requires the action to be one that could
not have been commenced in a federal court in the absence of ju-
risdiction under section 1334(b). If there is any basis for federal
jurisdiction, the mandatory abstention feature is not applicable.
Such jurisdiction need not be based on the Bankruptcy Code or
section 1334. The statute simply requires that the suit otherwise
could not have been brought in a federal court. If it could have
been brought in a federal court, absent bankruptcy, on the basis of
diversity of citizenship or the presence of a federal question, sec-
tion 1334(c)(2) does not apply. A probable purpose of this subsec-
tion is to preserve "state's rights" on the theory that not every case
should be tried in the bankruptcy court, particularly if purely state
law issues are involved. If the action could not have been brought
in federal court absent bankruptcy, it should be litigated in state
court if one of the parties so desires. 78 The claim in the Northern
Pipeline case would not have been subject to mandatory absten-
tion because diversity of citizenship existed.
The final requirement for mandatory abstention is that the
state court action can be timely adjudicated. This requirement
probably derives from section 57 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
which provided that if adjudication, estimation, or liquidation of
contingent or unliquidated claims would unduly delay the adminis-
tration of the estate, the claims should be disallowed. The court
should consider the state court calendar and the status of the Code
case. Some considerations for the bankruptcy court's determina-
tion whether to mandate abstention and await the state court ad-
judication are the type of case, that is, if it is a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion or a Chapter 11 reorganization case, if it is a complex case,
and if it is going to take long to close the case, to administer it, or
to confirm a plan.
E. Jury Trial
Former 28 U.S.C. § 1480 contained a broad right of trial by
jury in bankruptcy cases. It provided that, to the extent the right
78. Early drafts of section 1334(c)(2) indicate that Congress originally intended to in-
clude personal injury tort actions in the mandatory abstention provisions but § 157(b)(4) as
finally enacted exempts these actions from the mandatory abstention provisions of §
1334(c)(2).
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existed under any statute on September 30, 1979, the right was
retained. The trial before a jury would be held in the bankruptcy
court because of the pervasive jurisdiction granted to that court in
section 1471(c). The 1984 amendments added section 1411 to Title
28, which contains the limited provision in subsection (a) that Ti-
tle 11 "do[es] not affect any right to trial by jury that an individual
has under applicable nonbankruptcy law with regard to a personal
injury or wrongful death tort claim." This provision does not refer
to other causes of action, such as breach of contract, in which there
would be a right to trial by jury absent bankruptcy. Section 1480
no longer is applicable because if it was not repealed outright, it
was at least implicitly repealed by section 1411. 79 If repeal were
not the intention, section 1411 would have been unnecessary. Sec-
tion 1480 already addressed the subject matter of section 1411. Ac-
cordingly, section 1411 severely limits the scope of former section
1480 and limits the right to trial by jury. As will be discussed, the
entire jurisdictional structure of the 1984 amendments also leads
to this conclusion.
Two basic questions arise. First, if there is a proceeding in the
bankruptcy court in which, absent bankruptcy, there would be a
right to trial by jury, may the bankruptcy court, on timely de-
mand, order a jury trial? Second, can the personal injury tort claim
be tried by jury only in the district court, or may it also be tried by
a jury in the bankruptcy court?
The bankruptcy court is a court of equity, in which there is no
79. The 1984 amendments contain inconsistent provisions with respect to the repeal or
continuing effectiveness of Title 28 sections added in 1978 with an effective date of April 1,
1984. One of those sections was § 1480, which contained the broad retention of the right to
trial by jury. Section 113 of Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 343 (1984), provides that § 402(b)
of Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2682 (1978), shall not become effective. Section 402(b) en-
compasses 28 U.S.C. § 1480. Section 121 of Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 345 (1984), however,
states that § 402(b) and (e) of Pub. L. No. 95-598, 98 Stat. 333 (1984), shall become effective
on the date of enactment of the 1984 amendments, which was July 10, 1984. Many of the
provisions in Title 28 that originally were to become effective on April 1, 1984, are inconsis-
tent with the provisions in Title 28 as changed or added in 1984. The obvious intent of
Congress was to repeal the 1978 provisions but this was done very inartfully. Nevertheless,
at least two decisions have held that § 113 overrides § 121 and causes a repeal. Thus, § 1411
rather than § 1480 controls the right to jury trial in proceedings arising in or related to cases
under the Bankruptcy Code. In fact, if § 1480 remained in effect, § 1411 would be unneces-
sary; its provisions would be encompassed within § 1480. See Precon, Inc. v. JRS Realty
Trust, Civ. No. 84-0085-P (D. Me. 1985); In re Long, 43 Bankr. 692 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1984). Other courts have held that § 1480 was implicitly repealed because § 1411 covers the
same subject matter. In re Riggsby, 745 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1984) (§ 1293 implicitly re-
pealed); G.S.H., Inc. v. Pemberton (In re Nilsson), 12 BANK. CT. DEC. (CRR) 473 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1984) (repeal of § 1478, the former removal provision).
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right of trial by jury.80 That is perhaps one reason why Congress
limited the operation of section 1411 as it did. The only matter
that the bankruptcy court, by virtue of section 157(b)(5), cannot
hear under any circumstances is a personal injury or wrongful
death tort claim. Subsection (b)(5) provides that these actions
shall be tried in the federal district court. It is in the federal dis-
trict court that the right to trial by jury exists. A district court is a
court of law, and not only a court of equity.
Thus, there is no right to a jury trial in core proceedings.
Moreover, there is no authorization in Title 11 or Title 28 for
bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials. In the Bankruptcy Act
1898, section 19 gave a right to jury trial on the issues contained in
an involuntary bankruptcy petition. Nothing in the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 prevented the bankruptcy judge, then a referee in
bankruptcy, from conducting a jury trial if properly demanded
pursuant to section 19. In 1966, however, the Judicial Conference
of the United States adopted a resolution barring referees in bank-
ruptcy from conducting jury trials.8 " Thus, it was necessary to refer
trials on involuntary petitions to the district court. Debtors de-
manded jury trials almost routinely in order to cause delay and
take advantage of whatever leverage such demand offered. But one
could not have stated with any authority that Congress thought
the referees in bankruptcy were not qualified to conduct the jury
trials. The bankruptcy rules that became effective in 1973 author-
ized the referees, redesignated by the rules as bankruptcy judges, 2
to conduct jury trials.8 3 In the 1984 setting, there is no such
authorization.
The Supreme Court recognized the lack of a general right to
80. "[I]t is well settled, however, that trials without a jury in bankruptcy proceedings
are not a violation of constitutional right, because such proceedings are equitable in nature.
Thus a summary proceeding in the bankruptcy court to turn over property. . . carries with
it no right to a jury trial." 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY at 238 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978) (citing
Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881)); In re Christensen, 101 F. 243 (D. Iowa 1900).
81. Proceedings, Judicial Conference of the United States 22 (1960); 1A COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY I 17.28A[6] (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978).
82. See former BANKR. R. 901(7).
83. Former Bankruptcy Rule 409(c) provided that if a right to jury trial existed in an
action to determine the dischargeability of a debt and was timely demanded, the bank-
ruptcy judge could conduct the trial if local rules of the district court so provided. Former
Rule 115(b), which established the procedure for the hearing on an involuntary petition,
provided that the bankruptcy judge would conduct the jury trial, if timely demanded, and if
the demand or local rule did not specify otherwise (for example, that the bankruptcy judge
would conduct it).
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trial by jury in the bankruptcy court in Katchen v. Landy.8 4 The
Court held that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to award an
affirmative judgment in favor of the bankrupt estate when the
trustee in bankruptcy asserted, as a counterclaim, a voidable pref-
erence received by the creditor. Normally, preference actions were
within the concurrent jurisdiction of the district court and the
state court, in which there was a right to jury trial."' But when the
transferee was also a creditor and filed a proof of claim, the Court
concluded that the bankruptcy court had summary jurisdiction to
determine the validity and amount of a preference and to award an
affirmative judgment. The Court held the nonexistence of a right
to a jury trial in the bankruptcy court to be of no moment.8 6
In the wake of the 1973 Rules and the 1970 amendments to
the Bankruptcy Act, which expanded the right to a jury, 7 the 1978
Reform Act gave full rights and powers to the bankruptcy court to
conduct jury trials. The pervasive jurisdiction of section 1471(c)
carried with it the full authority to conduct jury trials in all pro-
ceedings in which the right existed as provided in section 1480.
Northern Pipeline, however, held the jurisdictional scheme uncon-
stitutional. The 1984 amendments represent a retrenchment of ju-
risdiction in an effort to keep the statute constitutionally valid.
But one should not read the restrictive provisions of the 1984
amendments more broadly than written. Neither should the 1984
amendments be interpreted as incorporating the scheme of the
1978 Act merely because it provided an efficient system of judicial
administration. It would seem that district judges have caused an
untenable situation in keeping the bankruptcy court from being an
article III court with its full panoply of powers and at the same
time using the article I bankruptcy court to do all the work the
Supreme Court has said only an article III court can do.
A jury is not appropriate in noncore proceedings heard by the
bankruptcy court because the bankruptcy court cannot enter a fi-
nal order. Instead, the bankruptcy court merely enters proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. When the proposed find-
ings are sent to the district court for entry of the final order, noth-
ing in section 157(c)(1) authorizes the district court to convene a
jury. The findings of fact already have been made as far as the
district court is concerned. At most, it need only consider the pro-
84. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
85. See §§ 23b and 60b of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
86. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 337-38.
87. See § 17c(3) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898; see also BANKR. R. 115 and 409.
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posed findings or review the findings de novo if an objection has
been made.
The unavailability of jury trials is clear. There is no right to a
jury in the bankruptcy court.8 Nor is there such a right in the
district court. All the matters in which there otherwise might be a
right to trial by jury, other than personal injury matters, are not
heard by the district court in the first instance. If withdrawal oc-
curs, the matter can come before the district court but it does not
begin there. Withdrawal is merely a second step in the process; it
will not serve to retain a right to trial by jury. The personal injury
action, on the other hand, does not start in the bankruptcy court,
but rather begins and ends in the district court. While it was prob-
ably unnecessary to state that the right to a jury trial was retained,
Congress decided to make it clear. In fact, section 1411(a) would be
totally redundant if the right to jury trial continued to exist in
88. It should be noted that several courts, including several district courts, have held
that there is a right to jury trial in bankruptcy matters other than personal injury actions
and that the bankruptcy court may conduct them. No authority is stated in the decisions
nor is there any analysis to support the conclusions. What comes through clearly is that the
district judges, having defeated the article III proposal for bankruptcy courts, do not now
want to have anything to do with proceedings arising in bankruptcy cases and treat the
bankruptcy judges as continuing to have the outlawed pervasive jurisdiction contained in
the 1978 Reform Act. See Macon Prestressed Concrete Co. v. Duke, 85-1-MAC (M.D. Ga.
1985) (while there is no authority for bankruptcy judge to conduct jury trial, there is also no
prohibition); In re Arnett Oil, Inc., 44 Bankr. 603 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (defendant has right to
jury trial in preference recovery action). Contra In re Best Pack Seafood, Inc., 45 Bankr. 194
(Bankr. D. Me. 1984) (preference action is a core proceeding which is not triable by a jury).
See also In re Gibbons Constr. Co., 12 BANK. CT. DEC. (CRR) 463 (E.D. Ky. 1984) (the 1984
amendments removed the bar contained in the Emergency Rule and bankruptcy judge can
try jury case); In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 43 Bankr. 616 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984) (no prohi-
bition in 1984 amendments).
In one case, a district court found authority in Bankruptcy Rule 9015 for bankruptcy
judges to conduct jury trials. That court failed to recognize two fairly important matters: (1)
Rule 9015 merely established the procedure for demanding a jury trial if the right existed
under the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act (28 U.S.C. § 1480) and, (2) if Rule 9015 established
the substantive right of jury trial, it would be an invalid exercise of the rulemaking power
granted to the Supreme Court by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 2075 because the rules may only
relate to procedural matters and may not create substantive rights. See infra note 94; see
also Lombard-Wall Inc. v. N.Y.C. Housing Dev. Corp. (In re Lombard-Wall Inc.), No. 82 B
11556 slip op. (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The Lombard-Wall court's analysis is as follows:
We note first that the parties have proceeded to this point under the mistaken
assumption that a jury trial is unavailable in the bankruptcy court. They have appar-
ently overlooked rule 9015. . . which permits the bankruptcy courts to hold jury trials.
The advisory committee notes to Rule 9015 confirm this interpretation. The notes
speak of 'the procedures for requesting trial by jury in a matter [before the] . . . bank-
ruptcy court.'. .. Having concluded that the bankruptcy court may hold a jury trial
Id. (Emphasis added).
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other types of disputes.
Section 1411(b) provides that the district court may order is-
sues arising under section 303 to be tried without a jury. Former
section 1480(b) of Title 28 contained almost precisely the same
provision and changed what had been the law under the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, which, as noted, granted the debtor a right to
jury trial on the issues raised in an involuntary petition.", One dif-
ference between former section 1480(b) and section 1411(b) is that
section 1480(b) placed the authority to order the issues tried by a
jury in the bankruptcy court, while section 1411(b) places it in the
district court.
While the judicial scheme of section 1411(b) lacks convenience
and efficiency, it certainly seems to reflect what Congress intended
in light of the prior history of jury trials in bankruptcy cases and
in light of other congressional efforts to draft a statute that mini-
mally appears constitutional. In any event, section 1411(b) is su-
perfluous, irrelevant, and unnecessary. It clearly is copied from for-
mer section 1480, changing only the reference to the district court
from the bankruptcy court. Even though the provision was needed
in the former bankruptcy system, its justification has since been
lost. Former section 1480(a) continued the right to trial by jury in
the bankruptcy court as it existed by statute on September 30,
1979. Section 19 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 contained a statu-
tory right to a jury trial. If subsection (b) had not been included in
section 1480, subsection (a) would have retained the right to a jury
trial on issues of an involuntary petition. The intent was not to
retain the right, but to place the decision whether to have a jury in
the discretion of the bankruptcy judge. Section 1411 does not re-
tain the jury trial as it existed by statute. The issues raised by an
involuntary petition filed under section 303 do not create any right
to jury trial. Absent a right, there was no need to change it to a
privilege that could be denied by the court. No harm would have
resulted had subsection (b) of section 1411 been omitted.
A final question regarding the right to a jury arises with re-
spect to removed actions. Section 1452 provides that a party may
remove a civil action to the district court if the district court has
89. Such issues would be the bankrupt's insolvency and the commission of an act of
bankruptcy. It should be noted that the right to a jury trial was a matter of legislative grace
and not of constitutional necessity. "The right to a jury under § 19a is one accorded the
alleged bankrupt solely by the Bankruptcy Act and not by the provisions of the seventh
amendment; trials without a jury in bankruptcy proceedings are not a violation of the Con-
stitution." 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 80, at 226.
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jurisdiction under section 1334(b). Assume that a civil action is
pending in state court in which there is a right to trial by jury. A
case under the Bankruptcy Code is commenced and the action is
removed to the district court. Once there, the proceeding falls
under the automatic reference contained in section 157(a), and it is
within the province of the bankruptcy court either to enter a final
order, if it is a core proceeding, or to submit proposed findings of
fact, if it is a noncore proceeding. The mere advent of a bank-
ruptcy case has deprived a party of a right to jury trial that other-
wise would have existed. Even though the system appears arbi-
trary, it should be applied in this manner because Congress' intent
is clear. It is up to Congress to amend section 1411 if a change is
desirable.
F. Appeals
Traditionally, bankruptcy cases have been appealed to the dis-
trict court and then to the United States court of appeals. The
1984 amendments maintain this appellate route. Questions arise
whether the 1984 amendments contain any alternative routes or
eliminate any other routes available under the 1978 Code. Under
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, an alternative was to appeal
directly to the court of appeals by agreement of the parties.90 The
parties were not required to obtain consent of the court of appeals,
district court, or bankruptcy court. That route no longer is availa-
ble. Section 158 does not sanction direct appeal to the court of
appeals from the bankruptcy court under any circumstances. The
only alternative contained in section 158 is the bankruptcy appel-
late panel,91 which can be established by the judicial council of
each circuit. These panels also existed under the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978, but the 1984 amendments have effected two
changes to the 1978 method. First, in addition to the requirement
that the judicial council establish the bankruptcy appellate panel,
the district judges of each district in the circuit must authorize by
majority vote a direct appeal from the bankruptcy court to the ap-
pellate panel. Accordingly, even if there is a bankruptcy appellate
90. Former 28 U.S.C. § 1293(b) (effectively repealed by Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333). In Thistlewaite v. First
Nat'l Bank of Lafayatte (In re Exclusive Indus. Corp.), 751 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1985), it was
held that there was no jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal as a consequence of the 1984
amendments.
91. Former 28 U.S.C. § 160 (effectively repealed by Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333).
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panel, it does not necessarily mean that the district court is by-
passed. It is doubtful, however, that the judicial council would es-
tablish bankruptcy appellate panels to which the judges of the dis-
trict would not permit appeals to be taken. If the district judges do
not think it is a good idea to have a bankruptcy appellate panel,
the judicial council simply will refrain from authorizing its
establishment.
The second change requires all parties to the appeal to con-
sent before the bankruptcy appellate panel can hear the appeal. It
may be difficult to get unanimous consent and, therefore, to use
the appellate panel because the denial of consent may give some
tactical leverage to the party to an appeal that withholds consent.
A party may withhold consent in order to cause delay, to be obsti-
nate, to achieve a settlement, or to obtain any other perceived ad-
vantage such as a better chance of affirmance. The underlying con-
gressional purpose for requiring consent is to bolster the
constitutional underpinning of the entire statute. The bankruptcy
judge may enter a final order subject to appeal under section 158
only in a core proceeding or a noncore proceeding with consent. In
either event, the party does not have a hearing by an article III
judge. Congress may have felt that if bankruptcy appellate panels
were established, the party again would be deprived of a hearing
by an article III judge because bankruptcy judges would comprise
the panels. Therefore, Congress appears both to have assumed that
the right to an article III judge is a waivable right and to have
required consent in order to forestall a finding of constitutional
invalidity.
The distinction between final orders and interlocutory orders
is retained. The district court or appellate panel has jurisdiction to
hear appeals from final orders but interlocutory orders require
leave of the district court or panel."2
Section 158(c) contains two unfortunate references. First, sec-
tion 158(c) states that the time for taking an appeal is as set forth
in Rule 8002 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.93 Utilization of
a rule in this way is appropriate but the subsection is worded
poorly. Although the content of Rule 8002 can be changed, the rule
92. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) and (b); see In re Johns-Manville Corp., 45 Bankr. 833 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1984) (leave should be granted liberally if it can expedite case).
93. Rule 8002(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 10 days after entry of
the order from which appeal is taken, but subdivision (c) permits a short extension of the
time under certain circumstances.
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number itself cannot be changed.94 For example, if Part VIII of the
Bankruptcy Rules were deleted in order to restructure the rule
package, Rule 8002 nonetheless would have to be retained, absent
a statutory amendment to section 158. The second troublesome as-
pect of section 158(c) is the statement that an appeal to either the
district court or the bankruptcy appellate panel from final orders
of the bankruptcy judge shall be taken in the same manner as ap-
peals in civil proceedings generally are taken to the courts of ap-
peals from the district courts. The reason for this statement's in-
clusion is unknown and its meaning may be difficult to determine.
It might mean that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are
applicable, which would make Part VIII of the Bankruptcy Rules
superfluous. On the other hand, subsection (c) logically should be
considered a very general provision and not a specific procedural
reference. Nevertheless, this unfortunate language will have to be
considered when drafting and applying new bankruptcy rules.
IV. CONCLUSION
The complexity and possible invalidity of the 1984 amend-
ments arise from Congress' refusal to constitute the bankruptcy
courts as article III courts. The only group, if any, that this refusal
has aided is the district court bench, by keeping their numbers
small (except to the extent that additional bankruptcy duties re-
quire additions to their numbers) and their status elite. The con-
gressional action works against the needs of all parties involved in
the functioning of the Bankruptcy Code and the judicial system
itself. Debtors in Bankruptcy Code cases are left uncertain as to
the authority of the bankruptcy courts adjudicating proceedings in
their cases. New layers of potential litigation tactics have been
added, which will further burden the bankruptcy court system and
the district court system, both of which have sufficient real and
legitimate work to perform. Aside from the merits of the argu-
ments opposing the bankruptcy system instituted pursuant to the
1984 amendments, in view of the Supreme Court's pronounce-
ments in Northern Pipeline, it is irresponsible for Congress to
have enacted legislation containing such inherent risks of constitu-
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1982), which grants authority to the Supreme Court to promul-
gate rules of bankruptcy procedure, does not permit any such rules to be inconsistent with
the statute. This is a change in the rulemaking power made by the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978. As 28 U.S.C. § 2075 originally was enacted, it provided that any provision in the
Bankruptcy Act that was inconsistent with the rules was deemed to be superseded by the
rules. This provision was deleted in 1978.
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tional invalidity when the lives of so many financially troubled per-
sons and companies look to the federal bankruptcy laws for a fresh
start and reorganized future.

